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ABSTRACT
In 1999 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director General of the World Health Organization, 
painted a stark picture of the global toll in morbidity and mortality that could be 
expected from tobacco consumption. “Tobacco-related diseases are spreading like 
an epidemic and are likely to be killing ten million people a year around 2020.”1 The 
warning  was  coterminous  with  the  drafting  by  the  WHO  of  the  Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, a treaty designed to interrupt and reverse the 
“epidemic’s” course. In the next decades attention to the impact of tobacco will 
shift to the less developed and rapidly modernizing nation. At this juncture it would 
be useful to review the almost half-century long public health campaign to confront 
tobacco  in  the  industrialized  nations,  where  extraordinary  achievements  in  the 
reduction of tobacco consumption reflect the impacts of persistent public health 
efforts in the face of powerful commercial resistance. 
The five countries we have focused on here France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States share a broad commitment to liberal political values 
yet they differ in important ways. Two are common law and two are civil law states. 
Japan is a “mixed” system; The US and Germany are federal systems. France, the 
United Kingdom and Japan are unitary. Yet despite these differences and those that 
characterized  their  first  encounters  with  tobacco  they  now  reflect  a  broad 
convergence  on  the  most  effective  public  policy  responses  to  smoking  related 
morbidity  and  mortality.  The  experiences  and  differences  of  these  nations  is 
important to note even though to some careful observers of the global politics of 
tobacco none would have been classed as pioneers in tobacco control. 
This analysis is drawn from a broader examination of the global picture of 
tobacco control at the end of the first decade of the 21st century.2
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INTRODUCTION
In the first half of the 20th century, tobacco consumption rapidly escalated 
in the world’s industrializing nations. Almost as quickly, with the emergence 
in midcentury of a scientific consensus that cigarette smoking posed a 
profound threat to the health of individuals and societies, there began an 
extraordinary movement to limit, control, and ultimately eliminate tobacco 
use. What started as a campaign fueled by public health advocates and 
resisted by private and public actors dependent upon tobacco revenues had, 
by century’s end, triggered far-reaching social, political, and economic 
changes in the United States and Western Europe. Although, as we shall 
see,  there  are  some  striking  differences  between  1963  and  2002,  the 
prevalence of smoking among men in the West was reduced by 50 percent; 
among women there were also significant if less dramatic achievements. 
Table 1 underscores the magnitude of the changes.
Table 1
Changesinprevalenceofsmokingamongmenandwomen
between1963-1965and2002
Men Women
1963 – 1965 2002 1963 – 1965 2002
France 72% 33% 33% 21%
Germany 61% 39% 31% 24%
Japan 83% 57% 16%  16.6%
United Kingdom 65% 28% 43%  26%
United States 52% 26%  33% 21%
Source: Feldman and Bayer 200440(p.300); Fukuda et al. 2005.4 
For much of the postwar era, the rates of smoking among Japanese men 
were almost twice that of other developed nations. In 1965, 83.2 percent of 
men smoked, and in 1997 57.6 percent were still smokers.3 Among women, 
there was virtually no change in that same 20-year period. More striking, TobaccoControlinIndustrializedNations 555
the steep social gradient in terms of income and edu  cation that characterizes 
smoking in Western Europe and the US was all but ab  sent. Ten years later, 
in 2004, a study found virtually no change in smoking at the popula  tion 
level among men. When the analysis was stratified by age, however, the 
impact  of  income  among  those  aged  25-39  was  most  obvious.  Thus, 
although overall smoking rates remained high, “the impact of income on 
smoking was not much smaller than in other industrialized nations”.4
What  strategies  and  policies  can  account  for  the  changes  we  have 
witnessed?  Do  they  tell  us  anything  about  what  may  be  necessary  to 
advance the public health campaign against tobacco? As industrialized 
nations  sought  to  confront  both  an  industry  that  manufactured  a  toxic 
product and a deeply embedded pattern of so  cial behavior, they pursued a 
common set of strategies. Among the first interventions was the requirement 
that cigarette packages and advertisements include warning labels. But 
warnings alone were quickly understood to be insufficient to counteract the 
impact of advertising. As a result, public health advocates began to press 
for limits or bans on the advertising and promotion of tobacco products.5 
In addition to their focus on advertising restrictions, tobacco control 
advocates have also pressed for price-based regulations. Tobacco has long 
been the object of taxation, and tobacco taxes have represented an important 
source of government revenue. By the 1980s, some economists began to 
argue that certain costs of smoking, such as health care expenditures and 
lost productivity, represented negative externalities.6 Those costs could be 
internalized,  they  claimed,  through  the  imposition  of  taxes.  Such 
justifications  would  assume  less  importance  as  public  health  officials 
increasingly asserted that the purpose of taxation was the suppression of 
demand. The extent to which the elasticity of demand was affected by the 
addictive nature of nicotine was a matter of some dispute, but the fact that 
prices could affect consumption, particularly by adolescents and others 
with limited disposable income, was beyond question. Whether such taxes 
are unacceptably regressive in light of the social gradient that has emerged 
or whether the increased burden on the relatively poor can be justified by 
the extent to which such burdens advance the health of those compelled to 
pay higher prices for cigarettes, remains controversial. 
Finally, governments have moved to restrict smoking in public settings. 
Such moves often occurred before the evidence of harm to non-smokers 
was substantiated,7 but ultimately science provided a powerful warrant for 
such environmental measures. Although third-party harms remained central 
to the argument for extending restrictions on public smoking, it was clear 
to careful observers that an equally important goal was to affect the behavior 
of smokers themselves.556 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No2
ADVERTISING
Tobacco advertising had been the target of public health campaigns since 
the 1960s, but bythe 1990s evidence clearly revealed that partial restrictions 
on advertising were ineffective because they resulted in the placement of 
promotional materials in unaffected media. France, in 1994, came early to 
the notion of a total ban on advertising. In the UK, the Tobacco Advertising 
Promotion Act of 2002 imposed a total prohibition on both advertising and 
the sponsorship of sporting events. Germany however, resisted this trend. 
Table 2 underscores this point.
Table 2
Legislationondirectadvertisingoftobaccoproducts,2006
Television, 
Cable, Video
Locally Printed 
Magazines and 
Newspapers
Billboards Cinema
France Ban Ban Ban Ban
Germany Ban No restrictions No restrictions Partial
United Kingdom  Ban Ban Ban Ban
Source: WHO Reg. Off. Eur. 2007.17
It is against this backdrop that the move by the European Union to ban 
all forms of tobacco advertising should be understood. In 2002, despite the 
opposition of Germany, the EU voted to prohibit advertising in magazines, 
in newspapers, on the Internet, and at international sports events.8 Three 
years later, the EU’s Tobacco Advertising Directive went into effect, and 
the EU Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection stated: “Banning 
tobacco advertis  ing is one of the most effective ways of reduc  ing smoking”.9 
In 2006, the European Court of Justice rejected Germany’s challenge to the 
bans. Focused solely on the question of whether such regulations were a 
le  gitimate exercise of EU-wide authority, and not whether the issue of 
restrictions on advertis  ing represented an intrusion on human rights, the 
Court stated that “the prohibitions of ad  vertising and sponsorship meet the 
conditions for them to be adopted for the purpose of the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market”.10 
The  situation  in  the  US  was  dramatically  different,  with  First 
Amendment  jurisprudence  providing  a  constitutional  pro  tection  for 
advertising unparalleled in other industrial democracies. Building on its TobaccoControlinIndustrializedNations 557
prior  decisions  protecting  “commercial  speech”,  the  Supreme  Court  in 
2001  ruled  against  an  ef  fort  by  Massachusetts  to  limit  billboards  that 
advertised  cigarettes  proximate  to  schools  (Lorillard Tok Co. v. Reilly
2001).11  With this history in mind, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) drafted new tobacco control legislation in 2009. The new regulations 
sought to prohibit outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet (300 meters) of 
schools and playgrounds, limit advertising to a simple block text on white 
background (the “tomb  stone” format) in publications with a signifi  cant 
youth readership, limit advertising in video to static black and white, and 
ban  brand  name  sponsorships  of  sporting  and  cultural  events  (Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 2009).12 The FDA’s approach 
fell far short of the EU’s effort to prohibit advertising in all print media, and 
indeed to some public health advocates was utterly inadequate (Why was 
1000 feet toxic but not 1001 feet?) but it did not go unchallenged. The 
American Civil Liberties Union, questioning the constitutionality of the 
proposed regulations, stated that “regulating commercial speech for lawful 
products  only because  those  products  are  widely  disliked”—even  for 
cause—was a dangerous precedent. “The antidote to harmful speech can be 
found in the wisdom of countervailing speech—not in the outright ban of 
the speech perceived as harmful.”13
Similar civil liberties concerns do not explain the state of advertising 
restrictions in Japan, however. Although the Tobacco Enterprise Law of 
1984 discouraged “excessive” advertising, it imposed no sanctions. Rather, 
the  limited  tobacco  advertising  in  Japan  is  explained  by  the  powerful 
influence of Japan’s own tobacco industry, which did not favor spending 
money on advertising and indeed had much to fear from campaigns that 
might  lure  smokers  to  newly  available  American  products.  The  first 
guidelines to restrict advertising were issued in 1989 and imposed limits on 
television and radio ads.14 A decade later, new regulations were issued 
banning ads on television, radio, and the Internet and in movie theaters. In 
addition, the rules discouraged advertising in publications that appealed to 
youth and women and banned billboards within 300 feet (90 meters) of 
schools. The ubiquitous posters on buses, subways, and trains remained 
untouched.  In  2004,  the  Japanese  government  moved  to  impose  more 
restrictive measures, banning ads on trains and buses.14 Strict limits were 
also placed on the frequency of newspaper advertisements, limiting them to 
12 per year. Thus, legal restrictions on tobacco advertising in Japan are 
weaker  than  in  many  other  industrialized  nations,  but  they  have  been 
strength  ened in recent years and, along with industry self-regulation, have 
contributed to an overall decline in tobacco advertising.558 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No2
TAXES
The move toward broad policy convergence among industrialized nations is 
also reflected in their shared recognition of the central role that taxes can 
play in reducing tobacco consumption. In 2010, experts from 12 nations 
met under the auspices of the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
to review and assess the evidence on tax and price policies in tobacco 
control. There was, asserted the group, “sufficient” evidence to conclude 
that there was a negative relationship between cigarette prices and cigarette 
consumption  in  countries  at  all  levels  of  income.  “Individual-level  or 
household-level data corroborate an inverse relationship between cigarette 
price  and  total  demand.”15  Speaking  to  the  issue  of  the  social  class 
dimensions of such taxation in industrialized nations, the expert group 
concluded that there was “strong” evidence that in high-income countries 
tobacco use among lower-income populations was more responsive to tax 
and price increases than was the case for higher-income populations. This 
important international review merely confirmed what was already under 
stood by public health officials in individual industrialized nations.
In Great Britain, the taxation of cigarettes for purposes of public health 
began in the 1970s, and thereafter there were annual tax increases. In the 
1990s, the social class gradient and the incidence of taxation emerged as an 
issue for those concerned about equity. Nevertheless, the centrality of tax 
policy to reducing population-level tobacco use led in 1992 to the policy 
report TheHealthoftheNation,in which the government stated that it 
would raise the tax on cigarettes at least three percent per year to help 
reduce  smoking. Tax  rates  continued  to  rise  in  the  next  years,  in  part 
because they were linked to inflation. In 2010, the activist group Action on 
Smoking and Health argued for yet another tax hike: “[When] tax accounts 
for over 75 per cent of the retail cost of a typical packet of cigarettes, is 
there justification for raising the tax level further? We believe there is”.16(p.5)
In  France,  tobacco  consumption  increased  throughout  the  1980s, 
defying the pattern in the US and other economically advanced democracies, 
and  remained  stable  in  the  early  1990s.  There,  the  enactment  of  the 
muscular Evin Law in 1991, which contained prescribed tax increases, had 
a demonstrable impact on tobacco consumption. A WHO analysis of the 
relationship between price and tobacco consumption in France concluded 
that from 1993 to 2000 tax increases caused the price of cigarettes to go up 
annually by five percent. More dramatically, legislation in 2003 raised the 
price of cigarettes by 40 percent and caused sales to fall by 33.5 percent.17 
The impact of such taxes was not lost on financial analysts. As Morgan 
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reducing demand for tobacco, clearly the one that concerns the cigarette 
companies the most is rising taxation”.18(p.14)
The situation has been different in Germany, where resistance to strict 
tobacco control measures has long been a characteristic of public policy. At 
the start of the 21st century, one analyst concluded that “Germany still ranks 
among the few European countries that have abstained from dramatic [tax] 
increases”.19  However,  beginning  in  2001,  there  were  five  annual  tax 
increases on cigarettes, with the net result of a 33 percent rise in the real 
price of cigarettes.20 Then, in 2010, the German government announced an 
increase of the tobacco tax. But on this occasion, the measure was clearly 
designed to enhance revenues to compensate for expected financial loses that 
would be incurred as a result of tax relief measures for the energy industry, 
which would lead to a revenue shortfall without higher taxes in other sectors.
In the US, where pressing for tobacco tax increases had long been a 
central strategy of public health officials and activists, the financial crisis of 
2008 drove states to increase cigarette taxes as a way of confronting fiscal 
concerns. Whatever the motivation, such levies were welcomed by those 
committed  to  reducing  tobacco  consumption.  Because  excise  taxes  on 
cigarettes are largely a matter of state and local policy, vast discrepancies 
characterize how effectively price has been used as a strategy for reducing 
consumption.21 In 2010, New York State’s tax of $4.20 per pack led the 
nation. Four additional states had taxes above $3.00. Twenty-one states, 
however, taxed cigarettes at less than $1.00, and Missouri imposed a tax of 
only  17  cents. The  extensive  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  tax 
increases (and consequent price increases) on overall cigarette consumption 
provided the foundation for those who continued to press for higher taxes 
and who decried the existence of states that failed to employ such a policy 
lever. For the American Lung Association, which lamented the failure to 
use cigarette tax revenues to fund smoking cessation programs, the answer 
to the question, “What is the appropriate level to tax cigarettes to protect 
public health?” is simple: “The higher the better”.21(p.35)
There were, however, some dissenting voices in the tobacco control 
community. Given the social gradient of tobacco consumption in the US, 
there was concern about the burden of higher taxes on the relatively poor, 
who could not or would not give up cigarettes. Others were troubled by the 
neo-prohibitionist  implications  of  ever  higher  taxes.  At  stake  was  the 
fundamental question of how and under what circumstances the claims of 
public health could justify limitations of the self-regarding harmful behavior 
of adults. Robert Rabin, who for years oversaw the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation’s  work  on  tobacco  and  drug  policy,  expressed  the  concern 
pointedly. “Why not a defacto ban through aggressive use of the excise tax? 560 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No2
As a practical concern, a smoking ban carries all of the attendant risks of 
smuggling and other illegal forms of access. The historical experience in 
the  Prohibition  Era  has  left  an  indelible  imprint  on American  political 
thought. But more fundamentally; an outright ban raises the ethical issue of 
whether the state should engage in such a proactive course of paternalism.”22
Japan,  where  smoking  rates  among  men  were  higher  than  in  other 
industrialized na  tions and where Japan Tobacco’s intimate involvement 
with the state (the government owns 50%) has left an indelible mark on the 
politics of cigarette consumption, came late to the explicit use of tax policy 
to confront the challenge of tobacco consumption. Nevertheless, even there 
the global trend toward using tax policy to curb smoking was evidenced in 
2010. In support  ing a tax increase that would raise the price of cigarettes by 
30 percent, the Ministry of Health de  clared that “tobacco poses health 
problems. It may be necessary to raise [the tax] to the lev  els of Europe.”23 
“We hope the price increase will discourage smokers from buying cigarettes 
and eventually help them quit smoking.”24
LIMITS ON PUBLIC SMOKING
Restrictions on smoking in public settings were slow to take hold in Europe, 
despite  the  efforts  of  tobacco  control  advocates  who  centered  their 
arguments  on  the  negative  health  consequences  for  nonsmokers.  The 
WHO’s regional office for Europe noted that by 2001 no member state had 
achieved the goal of “eliminating involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke in 
all public places.”25 Table 3 makes clear how limited progress had been in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Table 3 
LimitsonpublicsmokinginFrance,Germany,andtheUK,2001
Health-care 
Settings
Government 
Facilities
Restaurants
Bars and 
Pubs
Indoor 
Work 
Places
France Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial
Germany
No 
restrictions
No 
restrictions
No 
restrictions
No 
restrictions
No 
restrictions
United 
Kingdom
No 
restrictions
No 
restrictions
Voluntary Voluntary
No 
restrictions
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During the next decade, extensive changes would occur. Commenting 
on  this  transfor  mation,  The Lancet in  2007  noted:  “Europe  is  finally 
stumbling out from under its centuries-old haze of cigarette smoke, as 
nations that have traditionally clung to their favorite vice” began to follow 
the examples set by Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Malta, Italy, and Sweden.26(p. 
1507) As of mid-2007, smoking bans went into effect throughout the UK. 
France, which had introduced some of the first public smoking restrictions 
in Europe in 1992, moved in 2007 to impose new restrictions, this time 
with a very different commitment to enforcement. In 2009, those bans were 
extended to restaurants and bars.27
In  2006,  the  complex  federal  politics  of  Germany,  as  well  as  the 
influence of the tobacco industry, thwarted initial efforts by Chancellor 
Angela  Merkel  to  impose  the  kind  of  restrictions  that  had  begun  to 
characterize public spaces in other EU settings. Instead, Berlin imposed 
bans in federal government buildings, on trains, and in train stations, and 
the 16 Länder were left to determine their own regulations. Bavaria took 
the lead. In a 2010 popular referendum, 60 percent of voters endorsed a ban 
on smoking in all clubs, bars, restaurants, cafes, and “beer tents”. The new 
restrictions, vehemently opposed by bar owners and restaurant associations, 
extended restrictions first imposed in 2008. 
Indicative of the changed political and cultural climate surrounding 
smoking in Europe, the European Commission’s top health official declared 
in October 2010 that he would press for EU-wide restrictions, stating that 
“we need a complete ban on smoking in all public spaces, transport and the 
workplace”.28
In the US, despite the passage of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco  Control  Act  and  the  FDA’s  new  tobacco  control  mandate, 
regulating public smoking remains the prerogative of states and localities. 
As  a  consequence,  limitations  vary  widely.  The  American  Lung 
Association’s 2010 Annual Report, StateofTobaccoControl,presents a 
stark picture. In a grading system based exclusively on the regulation of 
public smoking, 22 states were given an “A” rating, including the entire 
West Coast, New England (with the exception of New Hampshire), New 
York, and New Jersey; eight were given a “B” rating; and 12 states received 
an “F” rating.21 According to the American Nonsmoker’s Rights Foundation, 
in 2011 almost 80 percent of the US population lived in locales that banned 
smoking in workplaces and/or restaurants and/or bars; approximately 50 
percent lived in areas that banned smoking in all workplaces, restaurants, 
and bars.29 562 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No2
Notably, although the American Lung Association expressed concern 
about what it characterized as “drastically” slow passage of comprehensive 
smoke-free  laws,  striking  evidence  revealed  an  increasing  receptivity 
among public health advocates to ever more restrictive measures. Steven 
Schroeder (former president of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) and 
Kenneth  Warner  (former  dean  of  the  School  of  Public  Health  at  the 
University of Michigan), for example, have noted approvingly the prospect 
of extending smoke-free laws to automobiles where children are present, 
residential apartments and condominiums, and public parks and beaches.30 
Indeed, in 2010 New York’s City Council passed legislation proposed by 
the Commissioner of Health to prohibit smoking on all beaches, in all 
parks,  and  in  all  pedestrian  malls,  and  there  was  little  sign  of  public 
opposition to these restrictions. In so doing, New York joined more than 
500 other communities that had already taken some steps to bar smoking in 
outdoor settings.31
The picture looks very different in Japan, which among industrialized 
nations remains the least receptive to imposing extensive restric  tions on 
smoking in public settings. But even Japan has experienced changes. In 
2003, the country’s most significant tobacco control leg  islation, the Health 
Prevention Law, went into effect. Despite its weak wording, it has spurred 
a  wide  range  of  actions.  Ten  private  railway  companies  in  the  Tokyo 
Metropolitan area, for example, banned smoking in all their stations. West 
Japan  Railway,  a  major  carrier,  banned  smoking  at  all  of  its  1,200 
stations.14(p.778) In 2006, 60 municipalities—whose residents constitute ten 
percent  of  Japan’s  population—had  some  form  of  tobacco  regu  lation, 
including in some cases prohibitions on smoking on sidewalks. However, 
only in 2010 did the Ministry of Health propose regulations requiring local 
governments to ban smoking in schools, hospitals, offices, and buses, but it 
continued to allow restaurants, bars, and hotels to maintain smoking areas. 
Kanagawa, Japan’s second largest (of 47) prefecture, with nine million 
residents,  enacted  a  statute  in  2010  that  largely  mirrored  the  Health 
Minister’s proposals.32
DENORMALIZATION
Each of these policy strategies—bans on advertising, increasingly steep 
excise taxes, and ever more restrictive measures regarding public smoking—
contributed  to  a  drop  in  smoking  prevalence.  It  would  be  a  mistake, 
however,  to  examine  each  policy  in  isolation  and  not  observe  their 
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the  increasingly  restrictive  policy  context  has  both  drawn  upon  and 
contributed to the transformation of social norms surrounding smoking. As 
social historian Allan Brandt put it, during the latter part of the twentieth 
century, the “aroma” of smoke had become a “stink”.33 The process of 
denormalizing smoking was, at first, the consequence of the public health 
interventions discussed above. But as evidence began to accumulate about 
how denormalization itself could have a significant impact on the prevalence 
of smoking, a striking change occurred. Tobacco control advocates and 
public policy makers began to explicitly pursue denormalization, seeing it 
not simply as a desirable consequence of other policy interventions but as 
a discrete policy goal, one that could in turn provide the social context for 
ever more restrictive measures.
In the US, for example, the Massachusetts tobacco control program 
thus noted, “norms that allow smokers to smoke in most venues, including 
while at work or home, provide little incentive to quit”.34(pp.79-80) Florida’s 
tobacco control efforts sought to “deglamorize” smoking, and the extent to 
which students were “less likely to buy into the allure of tobacco” was 
reviewed as a mark of their efforts’ impact.35 California’s campaign to 
“denormalize” to  bacco consumption sought “to push tobacco use out of the 
charmed circle of normal desirable practice to being an abnormal practice”.36 
Lauding  the  efforts  of  the  California  Health  Department,  Gilpin  et  al. 
embraced  the  force  of  social  con  formity,  noting,  “In  a  society  where 
smoking is not viewed as an acceptable activity, fewer people will smoke, 
and  as  fewer  people  smoke,  smoking  will  become  ever  more 
marginalized.”37(p.38)
In Europe as well, the utility of denormalization has been embraced. In 
2007,  a  report  from  the  Directorate  General  of  Health  and  Consumer 
Protection of the European Com  mission titled “Towards a Europe Free 
from Tobacco Smoke” noted that among the benefits of restrictions and 
limits on public smoking was that “they contributed to the denormalization 
of  smoking  within  society”.38(pp.8,24)  That  broad  transformation  would, 
according to the report, contribute to facilitating quitting by smokers and 
discourage children and adolescents from beginning to smoke. 
By 2010, the process of denormalization had become so important to 
those committed to advancing the public health agenda on tobacco smoking 
that  the  editor  of  Tobacco Control, the  leading  international  academic 
research and policy journal, argued that “score card” accounts of progress 
on tobacco control should be complemented with data on the “diverse ways 
that the positive culture of smoking has been eroded”.39(p.31)564 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No2
THE SOCIAL GRADIENT: A PRODUCT OF SUCCESS
Public  health  interventions  in  advanced  industrialized  nations  have 
produced  remarkable  changes  at  the  population  level  as  noted  in  the 
introduction to this paper. These striking achievements, however, fail to 
make  clear  the  emergence  of  a  steep  social  gradient  in  smoking  that 
accompanied this transformation. With extraordinary rapidity, what had 
once promised to be a broadly democratic advance is increasingly inscribed 
by sharp class disparities. By 1974, the gradient in the US was already 
clear: 52 percent of men with no high school diploma smoked, but that was 
true for only 28 percent of those who had graduated from college. By 2000, 
the rate of smoking had declined to 36 percent among men with less than a 
high school education and to 11 percent among those with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. A similar pattern was found among women. Whereas 36 
percent of less educated women smoked in 1970, 25 percent of those with 
university degrees smoked; 16 years later, the rates were 27 percent and ten 
percent, respectively. In Great Britain and France, the smoking rate at the 
end of the twentieth century was 2.3 times higher among men with low 
versus  high  educational  attainment.  For  women  in  Great  Britain,  the 
differential was 2.5, and in France it was 1.4.40(p.304)
What makes the social gradient of tobacco consumption, morbidity, and 
mortality in industrialized nations so striking is that it appears to have been 
created by public-health campaigns designed to limit tobacco consumption. 
There is abundant historical precedent. When previously uncontrollable 
diseases become subject to effective intervention or when the etiologic 
bases for disease is exposed and the prospect of interven  tion emerges, 
patterns of social inequality have long had a profound impact on who 
remains  at  risk.  Jo  Phelan  and  Bruce  Link,  whose  work  has  strongly 
influenced the “fundamental cause” perspective on public health, underscore 
this  point  in  their  paradoxically  titled  paper,  “Controlling  Disease  and 
Creating Disparities: A Fundamental Cause Perspective.” As their research 
demonstrates, “[w]hen we develop the ability to control disease and death, 
the benefits of this new-found ability are distributed according to resources 
of  knowledge,  money,  power,  prestige,  and  beneficial  social 
connections”.41(p.27)  Such  advantages,  they  have  demonstrated,  “shape 
individual health behaviors by influencing whether individuals are aware 
of, have access to, can afford, and are supported in their efforts to engage in 
health-enhancing behaviors”.41(p.29)TobaccoControlinIndustrializedNations 565
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The current state of affairs with regard to adult smoking in developed 
nations that have already adopted muscular tobacco control programs poses 
a difficult ethical and policy chal  lenge. In the US, smoking among adults 
stabilized between 2006 and 2008. In Europe, EU observers stated that 
“overall prevalence has reached a level from which it will be difficult to 
show  further  decline  unless  sub  stantially  stronger  measures  are 
implemented”.17 For some, the data suggested that there was no alternative 
but to further tighten the public health vise. The goal of limiting tobacco-
related morbidity and mortality provided ample warrant for pressing on. 
Others  were  less  certain.  Rabin  whose  concerns  about  the  potentially 
prohibitionist goals of ever higher taxes were noted earlier,22(p.1754) has thus 
noted:  “It  is  important  to  retain  perspective  on  the  fact  that  for  some 
smoking  is  a  pleasurable  and/or  psychologically  rewarding  experience. 
And correlatively, we should not lose perspective on the question of how 
restric  tive a society we want to create—that is, how-far we want to go in 
reducing individual auton  omy, including what can be perceived as self-
destructive behavior.” The issues are especially complex because significant 
decreases in the prevalence of smoking at the population level can only be 
achieved if measures are targeted at those at the lower end of the social 
gradient. It is they who would, in the long term, benefit from reductions in 
cancer and cardiovascular disease. The question that remains is whether 
such  benefits  provide  ample  justification  for  class-inflected  restrictive 
interventions in the near term.
Acronyms list:
FDA = United States Food and Drug Administration
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